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Available online 16 June 2016Goal-directed mental processes focused on oneself often co-occur with goal-directed mental processes focused
on other people or objects. However, little is known about themechanisms of this fundamental type of cognitive
interaction. The aim of this study was to determine the degree of cognitive interference associated with self-re-
lated processing compared with other-related processing. In two separate experiments, we found that an addi-
tional letter-case task interfered with self-recognition signiﬁcantly less than with the recognition of famous
and unknown others. This principal ﬁnding was consistent across the accuracy and latency of the participants'
responses and across different categories of autobiographical stimuli. Together, these results suggest that the
goal-directed processing of self-related stimuli is relatively effortless and that it could easily co-occur with addi-
tional mental tasks. Implications for models of access to self-concept and models of cognitive interference are
discussed.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
Self-concept
Automatic processing
Controlled processing
Cognitive interference1. Introduction
Many situations in everyday life involve an interaction between
goal-directed attention focused on oneself and goal-directed attention
focused on other people or objects. For example, one can monitor
one's own tone of voice or gestures when giving a talk while simulta-
neously checking the reactions of people in the audience. Surprisingly,
the mechanisms of this fundamental type of mental interaction remain
largely unknown. In particular, it is unclearwhether concurrent goal-di-
rected self-processing and other-processing interfere with each other
more or less than two goal-directed other-related mental processes.
To navigate the environment efﬁciently, people must rapidly select
sensory information that is relevant to their current behavioral goals.
They must also quickly redirect their attention and change their course
of action when faced with novel, potentially threatening, or rewarding
stimuli (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008). These two types of processesi).
. This is an open access article underrefer to goal-directed and stimulus-driven attention, respectively. Many
studies have focused on how sensory-driven (task-irrelevant) self-pro-
cessing interacts with concurrent behavioral tasks (Alexopoulos,
Muller, Ric, & Marendaz, 2012; Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Bundesen,
Kyllingsbaek, Houmann, & Jensen, 1997; Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, &
Deldin, 2004; Moray, 1959; Wolford & Morrison, 1980). However, less
is known about howgoal-directed (task-relevant) self-processing inter-
acts with additional mental tasks.
Automaticity develops as a function of repetition; the more fre-
quently and consistently a mental representation is accessed, the
lower its threshold of activation becomes (Bargh, 1994; Schneider &
Chein, 2003). In otherwords, after sufﬁcient training, the representation
becomes activated by the mere presence of a trigger, involuntarily, un-
consciously, and with minimal cognitive effort. In contrast, controlled
processes are intentional, aware, and effortful. Crucially, two controlled
mental processes interferewith each other to a greater degree than two
automatic processes and more than one automatic and one controlled
processes (Bargh, 1994; Moors, 2015; Schneider & Chein, 2003). The
most common way of explaining this interference effect is to assumethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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more than one process occurs at any givenmoment, there is less capac-
ity available for each individual process and performance is impaired
(Pashler, 1994). Thus, cognitive interference is an indicator of cognitive
effort. In the present study, we use this indicator to determine whether
goal-directed self-processing is more or less effortless than other-pro-
cessing (please note that other features of automaticity are outside the
scope of this study).
Self-concept refers to one's mental representation of one's own
identity, personality, social roles, and values (e.g., Oyserman, Elmore,
& Smith, 2012). The abilities to construct and consciously access this
representation (e.g., self-recognition or self-reﬂection) are considered
hallmarks of the human mind, as both ontogenetically (Zelazo, 2004)
and phylogenetically (Gallup, 1997), these abilities are among the last
cognitive functions to develop. Notably, one's own name seems to
have a central position in self-concept. The state of namelessness is con-
sidered equal to having no social identity (Watson, 1986). Even 5-
month-old infants differentiate the sound of their own name from
other names (Parise, Friederici, & Striano, 2010), and a preference for
the letters in one's own name is regarded as an implicit measure of
self-esteem (Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer, & Maio, 2008). Other autobio-
graphical facts, such as one's date of birth, hometown, or nationality,
are also crucial components of self-knowledge (Gray et al., 2004). In
this study, we use the processing of autobiographical semantic stimuli
to determine the degree of cognitive effort associated with access to
self-concept.
Because people often refer to their representations of self (e.g.,
Greenwald, 1980; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989) and because automaticity
develops as a function of repetition (see previous paragraphs), access to
self-concept should be related to minimal cognitive interference. In-
deed, Bargh (1982) showed that repeating aloud self-relevant trait ad-
jectives presented in one ear impairs the performance of a concurrent
visual detection task to a lesser extent than repeating self-irrelevant
trait adjective does. Similarly, MacDonald and Kuiper (1985) found
that better memory performance for self- than for other-related infor-
mation is unaffected by the presence of an additional cognitive task dur-
ing encoding. The subject's own name can also be reported with high
accuracy even when presented immediately after another target stimu-
lus; in contrast, other names are not noticed under such conditions
(Giesbrecht, Sy, & Lewis, 2009; Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997).
The above studies suggest that goal-directed self-processing produces
little cognitive interference.
However, self-relevant stimuli are also intrinsically salient (Sui, He,
& Humphreys, 2012; Sui, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2013); they easily
“grab” participants' attention (Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Moray, 1959;
Wolford &Morrison, 1980), and they trigger increased attention alloca-
tion responses (Tacikowski, Cygan, & Nowicka, 2014; Tacikowski &
Nowicka, 2010; Turk et al., 2011). If self-processing engages increased
cognitive resources, then according to the capacity-sharing principle,
self-processing should produce strong interference with concurrent
tasks. Turk et al. (2013) directly supported this claim; the participants
in their study categorized objects as belonging to themselves or to an-
other person while attending to or ignoring numbers concurrently
displayed on a computer screen. A latermemory test showed that divid-
ed attention during encoding resulted in decreased retrieval of objects
assigned to the self but not objects assigned to another person. Togeth-
er, these ﬁndings suggest that goal-directed self-processing produces
strong cognitive interference.
Certain methodological factors could underlie the abovementioned
inconsistent ﬁndings. For example, simply repeating self-relevant trait
adjectives (Bargh, 1982) or detecting one's own name among other
stimuli (Giesbrecht et al., 2009; Shapiro et al., 1997) might not involve
explicit goal-directed self-processing in the same way that self-reﬂec-
tion or self-recognition do. In turn,measuring the degree of interference
in a post-experiment memory test (MacDonald & Kuiper, 1985; Turk et
al., 2013) might be confounded by nonspeciﬁc factors that occurbetween the encoding and retrieval phases; such a post-experiment
test does not measure interference when it actually takes place. Finally,
all-or-none measures of interference, such as reportability or recall
(Giesbrecht et al., 2009; Turk et al., 2013), might not be sensitive
enough to capture the degree of interference associated with self-
processing.
The aim of this study is to provide conclusive evidence regarding the
degree of cognitive interference associated with goal-directed self-pro-
cessing. Taking into account the abovementioned methodological is-
sues, we made self-processing explicit and intentional by employing a
self-recognition task. In addition, we assessed cognitive interference
on a trial-by-trial basis (i.e., at the point when the two cognitive pro-
cesses actually co-occur), and we used a continuous measure of inter-
ference (i.e., reaction times). Our study had a 2 × 2 factorial design
with “person” (self vs. other) and “difﬁculty” (easy vs. hard) as the fac-
tors. During the “easy” session, the subjects were asked to determine
whether a name, a surname, a birthplace, or a nationality code referred
to themselves or to other people. In turn, during the “hard” session, the
person-recognition task described above was accompanied by a letter-
case task (“Decide whether a target is self- or other-related but only in
trials where the targets arewritten in lowercase letters”). This addition-
al “go/no-go” task had no particular relevance to our main research
question; its only role was to compete for cognitive resources with the
primary person-recognition task (Fig. 1A). As a result, there were four
experimental conditions: self-easy (SE), other-easy (OE), self-hard
(SH), and other-hard (OH). Our main dependent variables were error
rates (ERs) and reaction times (RTs). We used these variables to calcu-
late the degree of self-interference (Si) and other-interference (Oi), as
the SH N SE and OH N OE differences, respectively.
We hypothesized that if self-processing is more effortless than
other-processing, then the letter-case task should impair self-recogni-
tion signiﬁcantly less than it impairs other-recognition, as indicated by
the SiER b OiER and SiRT b OiRT differences. In contrast, if self-processing is
more effortful than other-processing, then effects in the opposite direc-
tion should occur (i.e., SiER N OiER and SiRT N OiRT).We tested these alterna-
tive hypotheses in two separate experiments conducted with two
different groups of participants. In the second experiment, we included
a condition that featured famous celebrities rather than unknown
others (as was used in the ﬁrst experiment) to control the effect of
sematic familiarity.
2. Experiment I
2.1. Materials and methods
2.1.1. Participants
Twenty-four naïve right-handed subjects (mean age: 26 ± 4 years,
fourteen females) participated in this study. All participants were
healthy, reported no history of psychiatric illness or neurological disor-
der, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants gave
their written informed consent before the start of the experiment. The
Regional Ethical Review Board of Stockholm approved the study.
2.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
As experimental stimuli, we used ﬁrst names, surnames, nationality
codes (e.g., “FRA” for France), and places of birth (names of villages,
towns, or cities) that were either self- or other-related. All words were
written in white letters (“Arial” font) and were presented centrally on
a black background. The viewing distance was kept constant for all par-
ticipants (chin-rest placed 70 cm away from the computer screen). All
stimuli in the “self” and “other” conditions had the same number of let-
ters to match the stimuli size.
In the “easy” session, the subjects had to keep track of only one stim-
ulus feature (identity), whereas in the “hard” session, the participants
had to pay attention to two features (identity and letter case). All
other aspects of stimuli presentation (stimuli, durations, order, etc.)
Fig. 1. Design and results of Experiment I. (A) During the “easy” session, the participants discriminated whether names, surnames, places of birth, or nationality codes referred to
themselves or to another person. During the “hard” session, the participants performed the same task but only if target words were written in lowercase letters (an additional “go/no-
go” task). Orange triangles indicate which targets were task-relevant in which session. Stimuli durations and intervals between stimuli are indicated next to the time axis. After each
target, the participants had 1000 ms to respond. The analyses of error rates (B) and reaction times (C) showed that the additional letter case task impaired self-processing signiﬁcantly
less than other-processing. The results were analogous for names and surnames (D) and for birthplaces and nationalities (E). Bar plots indicate means and standard errors; (*) and (^)
indicate p b 0.05 and p b 0.1, respectively.
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counterbalanced across the participants. The participants used the
“CTRL” and “NUM-ENTER” buttons on a standard keyboard to indicate
their responses. The buttons were pressed with the left and the
right index ﬁngers. The key assignment was counterbalanced across
participants. Both the accuracy and the speed of the responses were
emphasized in the instructions. Before each session, the participants
underwent a practice session (16 trials).
For each condition, the occurrence of names, surnames, nationality
codes, and townnameswas equiprobable. The “easy” and “hard” sessionsconsisted of 96 trials each (approximately 5 min) and there was a short
break between the two sessions (approximately 1 min). Within each
session, each trial type was repeated 24 times in pseudo-random order
(i.e., not more than three consecutive trials with targets referring to the
same person). The inter-trial intervals were 500, 750, or 1000 ms, and
these intervals were equally distributed across 96 trials. The stimuli
were displayed on an LCD computer screen (DELL S2409W; Dell Inc.,
Round Rock, Texas, US) with a 60-Hz refresh rate and 1920 × 1080 reso-
lution. Presentation software (version 16.2, Neurobehavioral Systems,
Inc., Albany, CA)was used to present the stimuli and to record responses.
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For each condition, we calculated the ERs as the percentage of trials
with incorrect responses. The RTs were extracted from the correct trials
only. After sorting the single-trial RTs according to each trial type, we
excluded outliers (i.e., values that were 1.5 inter-quartile ranges above
the third and below the ﬁrst quartile), and we calculated the average
RTs for each experimental condition. Notably, the total number of de-
tected outliers was very low (mean = 1 ± 1 trials; min. = 0 trials;
max. = 4 trials). To even up the number of trials between conditions
(i.e., 48 in the SE and OE conditions vs. 24 in the SH and OH conditions)
and to exclude any low-level differences among conditions (i.e., differ-
ent letter cases), from both sessions we used only the trials in which
the targets were written in lowercase letters. In this way, we could an-
alyze behavioral responses to the exact same physical stimuli but asso-
ciated with different tasks.
Based on the ER and RT data, we calculated the interference scores
(“hard” N “easy”) separately for the “self” and “other” conditions. We
ﬁrst ran the one-sample t-tests (two-tailed) on these interference
scores to conﬁrm that our basic manipulation of “difﬁculty” was effec-
tive. We expected more delayed RTs and higher ERs in the “hard” than
in the “easy” session (i.e., Si andOi signiﬁcantly higher than zero) and in-
deed this is what we found (see Table 1). With regard to our main hy-
potheses, Si and Oi were then compared to each other using the paired
t-test (two-tailed). We used the bootstrap method (5000 samples) in
these tests; bootstrapping is a robust statistical procedure that does
not rely on the normality assumption (Erceg-Hurn & Mirosevich,
2008). These bootstrap t-tests were conducted using the IBM SPSS soft-
ware (version 24, IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, US). In turn, effect sizes
(Cohen's d) and their 95% conﬁdence intervals (CI) were computed
using the “BootES” package with 5000 resamples (Kirby & Gerlanc,
2013). In the above text and in the Supplementary information, we re-
ported all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in Experiment I.
The data analysis did not inﬂuence the data collection. The sample size
was determined based on previous relevant studies (Alexopoulos
et al., 2012; Giesbrecht et al., 2009).
2.2. Results
Table 1 presents the ERs and RTs for each condition in Experiment I.
The ER data showed that SiER was signiﬁcantly weaker than OiER (mean
difference = −4.75%; SE = 1.9%; t23 = −2.49; p = 0.028; Cohen's
d = −0.51; CIlow = −0.84; CIhigh = −0.1). With regard to the RT
data, we found that SiRT was signiﬁcantly lower than OiRT (mean
difference = −26 ms; SE = 9 ms; t23 = −2.65; p = 0.013; Cohen's
d=−0.54; CIlow=−0.99; CIhigh =−0.08). These results consistently
show that the additional letter case task impaired self-processing less
than other-processing (Fig. 1B and C), which suggests that goal-directed
self-processing is more effortless than the processing of information
about other people.Table 1
Means and standard errors for all conditions in Experiment I.
RTs ERs
M SE^ n M SE^ n
SE 481 12 24 4.3 0.8 24
OE 530 16 24 3.2 0.7 24
SH 554 16 24 4.0 1.0 24
OH 630 19 24 7.5 1.8 24
Si 74⁎ 9 24 −0.3 1.1 24
Oi 99⁎ 13 24 4.4* 1.9 24
Abbreviations: ERs— error rates; M—means; n— number of observations, RTs— reaction
times; and SE — standard error. The RT data is reported in milliseconds, the ER data in
percentages.
⁎ Indicates that the interference score (“hard” N “easy”) was signiﬁcantly higher than
zero (one-sample t-tests, two-tailed, p b 0.05).
^ Indicates that standard errors were based on 5000 bootstrap samples.One might argue that the above ﬁndings were speciﬁcally driven by
the participants' processing of their own names and not by the process-
ing of self-relevant information in general. Indeed, one's own name oc-
curs countless times in everyday life and thus it could be processed
more effortlessly than other types of self-relevant information. To test
this possibility, we split our data by names and surnames vs. birthplaces
and nationalities. We then compared the SiRT and OiRT within these
datasets. For names and surnames, we found that SiRT was marginally
lower than OiRT (mean difference = −20 ms; SE = 10 ms;
t23 =−2.07; p= 0.055). For birthplaces and nationalities, SiRT was sig-
niﬁcantly weaker than OiRT (mean difference =−28 ms; SE = 13 ms;
t23 =−2.18; p= 0.038). This similar pattern of results for very differ-
ent types of autobiographicalmaterial suggests that the effortlessness of
self-processing is a general phenomenon rather than a stimulus-speciﬁc
one.
Another possible concern about Experiment I is that the effortless
processing of self-relevant stimuli was driven by the pre-experimental
familiarity of these stimuli rather than by their self-relevant nature
per se. Knowing that automaticity develops as a function of repetition
(Schneider & Chein, 2003) and that self-relevant stimuli occur very
often in one's everyday life, we could not rule out the possibility that fa-
miliarity played a role in our ﬁndings. In fact, there is an ongoing debate
in the literature regarding the role of familiarity in the preferential pro-
cessing of self-related information (Ma&Han, 2010; Qin et al., 2012; Sui
et al., 2012; Tacikowski, Brechmann, & Nowicka, 2013). To address this
familiarity issue,we designed a second experiment inwhichwe added a
control condition that contained familiar but not self-related social
stimuli. More speciﬁcally, we included a condition with stimuli that re-
ferred to famous celebrities. Based on previous ﬁndings showing that
preferential self-processing is independent from the stimulus familiari-
ty feature (Sui et al., 2012), we hypothesized that familiarity could not
explain our main ﬁnding from Experiment I; therefore, we expected
that the degree of interference should be still weaker in the “self” than
in the “famous” condition. Moreover, in Experiment II, we decided to
make the “hard” session even more cognitively demanding than in
Experiment I tomaximize the effect of cognitive interference and there-
by increase the method's sensitivity to putative small differences be-
tween the “self,” “famous,” and “unknown” conditions.
3. Experiment II
3.1. Materials and methods
3.1.1. Participants
Thirty-one naïve right-handed subjects (mean age: 27 ± 7 years,
eighteen females) participated in the study. All participants were
healthy, reported nohistory of psychiatric illness or neurologic disorder,
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants gave
their written informed consent before the start of the experiment. The
Regional Ethical Review Board of Stockholm approved the study. Be-
cause of technical problems (unsaved data), four participants were ex-
cluded. One additional participant was excluded because her accuracy
ratewas too low (only slightly above 50%). Themean age of the remain-
ing twenty-six participants (fourteen females) was 26 ± 6 years.
3.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
To make the discrimination between oneself, a famous person, and
an unknown person possible, we had to modify the set of experimental
stimuli used in the paradigm. That is, because people usually do not
know, for example, the exact birthdates of most celebrities, we used
only given names and surnames as experimental stimuli (presented to-
gether, given name above surname) in this experiment. For ease of ref-
erence, we will still refer to these stimuli as “names.” All names were
written in white letters (“Arial” font) and were presented centrally on
a black background. The viewing distance was the same for all partici-
pants (chin-rest positioned 70 cm away from the computer screen).
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thepreselected celebrity: (i) “Do you know this person?”; (ii) “What na-
tionality is this person?”; and (iii) “What is this person's occupation?”.
We included a given celebrity only if the ﬁrst answer was “yes” and
the following answers were correct; otherwise, we selected another ce-
lebrity. The unknown names were chosen randomly; we only made
sure that the participants did not know anyone with the same name
(none of the participants did). We used only one famous and one un-
known name for each participant (this was tomatch the number of rep-
etitions to the “self” condition), but different famous and unknown
nameswere used for different participants. In addition, the participants'
own names and the famous and unknown names were matched in
terms of gender and the number of letters.Fig. 2. Design and results of Experiment II. (A) During the “easy” session, the participants disc
letters. During the “hard” session, the participants performed the same person-recognition ta
(i.e., congruent trials). Thus, in the “hard” session, the participants had to keep track of th
durations and intervals are provided next to the time axis. After each target, the participant
would surpass the correction for multiple comparisons (but see the Results section). (C) R
unknown- and famous-related interference. Bar plots indicate means and standard errors; (*
method.Each trial started with a cue letter (“a” or “A”), followed by a target
name (e.g., “john smith” or “JOHN SMITH”), followed by a blank screen
when the participants were supposed to indicate a response (Fig. 2A).
Importantly, the letter case of the cuewas either congruent or incongru-
ent with the target's letter case. A total of 360 trials were presented in
two sessions (“easy” and “hard”), and each session consisted of 180 tri-
als presented for approximately 11 min (with an approximately 2-min
break between the sessions). Within each session, each of the 12 trial
types (Fig. 2A) was repeated 15 times in random order. The inter-trial
intervals were 500, 750, or 1000ms andwere equally distributed across
180 trials. The stimuli were displayed on the same computer screen that
was used in Experiment I, using the same software. All aspects of stimuli
presentation were identical for the “easy” and “hard” sessions. Theriminated between self-, famous-, and unknown-names regardless of the case of the cue
sk but only if the case of a cue letter was the same as the case of the target-name letters
e target identity and the cue-target congruency, which changed in every trial. Stimuli
s had 1600 ms to respond. (B) Error rate data did not show any signiﬁcant effects that
eaction time data showed that self-related interference was signiﬁcantly weaker than
) indicates p b 0.05; all p-values were corrected for multiple comparisons using the FDR
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arrow buttons on a standard keyboard were used to indicate responses
(“left”, “down”, and “right”). Button presses were made with the index,
themiddle, and the ringﬁngers of the right hand. Key assignment (three
possible combinations) was counterbalanced across the participants.
The instructions emphasized the importance of both the speed and ac-
curacy of the responses. Before each session, the subjects practiced the
task (12 trials).
3.1.3. Data analysis
The ER and RT data were analyzed analogously to Experiment I.
However, Experiment II had six experimental conditions: “self-easy”
(SE), “self-hard” (SH), “famous-easy” (FE), “famous-hard” (FH), “un-
known-easy” (UE), and “unknown-hard” (UH). All incongruent trials
were discarded from the analysis to match the number of repetitions
and physical features between the SE, FE, UE and the SH, FH, UH condi-
tions (see Experiment I). Outliers were detected and removed using the
same procedure as in Experiment I (mean = 1 ± 1 trials; min. = 0 tri-
als;max.=6 trials). Self-interference (Si), famous-interference (Fi), and
unknown-interference (Ui) were calculated for the ER and RT data as
the SH N SE, FH N FE, and UH N UE differences, respectively. We used
the same statistical procedures that were described in Experiment I.
However, because we planned to test all possible contrasts (i.e., Si vs.
Fi, Si vs. Ui, and Fi vs. Ui), we had to correct for the increased probability
of type I error resulting from performing multiple comparisons. To this
end,we used the False Discovery Rate approach (Benjamini&Hochberg,
1995) implemented in the “R” software (TheR Foundation for Statistical
Computing; version 3.2.1 GUI 1.66; https://www.r-project.org). In the
above text and in the Supplementary information, we have reported
all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in Experiment II. The data
analysis did not inﬂuence the data collection. The sample size was de-
termined based on Experiment I.
3.2. Results
Table 2 shows the ERs and RTs for all conditions in Experiment II. For
the ER data, we found that SiER and FiER did not differ signiﬁcantly (mean
difference = −0.12%; SE = 0.9%; t25 = −0.13; puncorrected = 0.9;
pcorrected=0.9; Cohen's d=−0.04; CIlow=−0.43; CIhigh=0.37). Sim-
ilarly, the difference between SiER and UiER was not signiﬁcant (mean dif-
ference = −2.54%; SE = 1.3%; t25 = −1.87; puncorrected = 0.07,
statistical trend; pcorrected = 0.11; Cohen's d=−0.37; CIlow =−0.76;
CIhigh = 0.07) and the difference between FiER and UiER was also not sig-
niﬁcant (mean difference = −2.42%; SE = 1.1%; t25 = −2.1;
puncorrected = 0.06, statistical trend; pcorrected = 0.11; Cohen's
d=−0.39; CIlow=−0.72; CIhigh= 0.01). Notably, although the differ-
ence between SiER and UiER did not surpass the correction for multipleTable 2
Means and standard errors for all conditions in Experiment II.
RTs ERs
M SE^ n M SE^ n
SE 544 13 26 1.6 0.5 26
FE 606 17 26 2.4 0.5 26
UE 596 15 26 2.3 0.7 26
SH 622 16 26 2.2 0.6 26
FH 712 24 26 3.1 0.8 26
UH 720 23 26 5.5 1.1 26
Si 78⁎ 9 26 0.5 0.6 26
Fi 106⁎ 17 26 0.7 0.8 26
Ui 124⁎ 19 26 3.1* 1.1 26
Abbreviations: ERs— error rates; M—means; n— number of observations, RTs— reaction
times; and SE — standard error. The RT data is reported in milliseconds, the ER data in
percentages.
⁎ Indicates that the interference score (“hard” N “easy”) was signiﬁcantly higher than
zero (one-sample t-tests, two-tailed, p b 0.05).
^ Indicates that standard errors were based on 5000 bootstrap samples.comparisons, the uncorrected p-value approached signiﬁcance (p =
0.07) and the effect was in the same direction as in Experiment I (com-
pare Figs. 1B and 2B).
For the RT data, we found that SiRT was signiﬁcantly lower than FiRT
(mean difference =−29 ms; SE = 12 ms; t25 =−2.46; puncorrected =
0.032; pcorrected = 0.048; Cohen's d = −0.48; CIlow = −0.79;
CIhigh =−0.09) and that SiRT was signiﬁcantly lower than UiRT (mean
difference =−46 ms; SE = 14 ms; t25 =−3.19; puncorrected = 0.009;
pcorrected= 0.027; Cohen's d=−0.63; CIlow=−0.93; CIhigh=−0.27).
0.27). The difference between FiRT and UiRT was not signiﬁcant (mean
difference =−17 ms; SE = 15 ms; t25 =−1.12; puncorrected = 0.29;
pcorrected=0.29; Cohen's d=−0.22; CIlow=−0.59; CIhigh=0.22). To-
gether, these results support the main conclusion from Experiment I
that self-processing is more effortless than other-processing. Addition-
ally, Experiment II showed that controlling the familiarity feature did
not eliminate the effect of lower interference associated with self-
processing.
4. Discussion
The aim of this studywas to determine the degree of cognitive inter-
ference associated with goal-directed self-processing. In Experiment I,
we showed that the additional letter case task interfered less with
self-recognition than with the recognition of other people. In
Experiment II, we reproduced this principal ﬁnding while controlling
for possible differences in familiarity between the “self” and the
“other” condition. These results indicate that goal-directed self-process-
ing could effectively co-occur with concurrent goal-directed cognitive
processes. Below, we discuss our ﬁndings regarding models of access
to self-concept and models of cognitive interference.
Our results support the notion that access to self-concept is highly
efﬁcient. Self-concept has long been proposed to act as a “reference
point” in countless cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes
during everyday life (Greenwald, 1980; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). Au-
tomaticity develops as a function of repetition; thus, access to self-con-
cept was proposed as automatic (Bargh, 1982; Greenwald, 1980;
Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones, 2005). Such auto-
maticity would have two consequences. First, if self-processing is
irrelevant to the current behavioral goal, then automatically triggered
self-processing should require active inhibition and thus would “steal”
cognitive resources from the primary task. This distracting effect of
self-processing has been extensively studied and largely conﬁrmed
(Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Moray, 1959; Nuñez, Casey, Egner, Hare, &
Hirsch, 2005; Wolford & Morrison, 1980; Wood & Cowan, 1995), al-
though important limitations of this effect have also been reported
(Bundesen et al., 1997; Devue, Laloyaux, Feyers, Theeuwes, & Brédart,
2009; Gronau, Cohen, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003; Harris & Pashler, 2004;
Kawahara & Yamada, 2004). The second prediction of self-automaticity
is that if self-processing is relevant to the current behavioral goal, then
self-processing should improve performance in a concurrent task
because the effortlessness nature of self-processing would enable
more cognitive resources to be directed toward a concurrent task
(Bargh, 1982). In light of the previous inconsistent ﬁndings (see the
Introduction), the current study provides important support for this
second prediction regarding self-automaticity.
It is important to ask what actually makes self-processing effortless.
High frequency of occurrence is one possible factor (Greenwald &
Banaji, 1989; Symons & Johnson, 1997), but other factors could also
play a role. For example, self-related andother-relatedmental processes
seem to engage separate computational workspaces in the brain
(Keenan, Nelson, O'Connor, & Pascual-Leone, 2001; Kircher et al.,
2000; but see Gillihan & Farah, 2005). If that is the case, these two
types of processes would never compete with each other to the same
extent as two other-related or two self-related processes. Such a com-
putational separation would explain why self-recognition engages at-
tentional resources preferentially (Tacikowski & Nowicka, 2010;
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with additional non-self-related tasks (the current study).
Along these lines, the neurocognitive model formulated by Dixon,
Fox, and Christoff (2014) seems to provide some additional clues re-
garding why self-processing sometimes strongly interferes with addi-
tional mental tasks (Turk et al., 2013) but produces little cognitive
interference in other situations (e.g., the current results). This model
proposes that (i) internally and externally driven modes of cognition
engage partly separate and partly overlapping brain networks and
(ii) these two modes of cognition compete with each other only when
they both involve a high level of intentional control; otherwise, they
could co-occurwithminimal interference or even facilitate one another.
It is noteworthy that in the present study, wemanipulated only the con-
tent (self vs. other), not the source (internal vs. external), of information
processing and that these two classiﬁcations are orthogonal to each
other (Lieberman, 2007). Nevertheless, just like internally and external-
ly driven cognition, self-processing and other-processing could involve
partly distinct and partly common neural networks and the two types
of processes could interfere with each other only when they are both
cognitively effortful (e.g., during a difﬁcult working memory task).
This interesting hypothesis could be directly tested in future neuroim-
aging studies. In general, the relationship between self-processing and
other-processing appears more complex than previously assumed.
More studies are needed to shed light on this fundamental type of men-
tal interaction.
The relationship between self-processing and other-processing has
potentially interesting implications formodels of cognitive interference.
As mentioned in the Introduction, oneway of explaining interference is
through limited capacity resources. Another view is that some mental
operations require a single dedicated mechanism and when two tasks
need this mechanism at the same time, a bottleneck results, and one
or both tasks becomedelayed (Pashler, 1994). Interestingly, neither “ca-
pacity-sharing” or “bottleneck” theories have established whether re-
sources/bottlenecks are unitary or not (Kahneman, 1973; Pashler,
1994;Wickens, 2002). If self-processing engages attention preferential-
ly, and if self-processing produces little cognitive interference with
other-related tasks, then this would suggest that multiple resources/
bottlenecks exist.
Regarding the ongoing debate about the nature of cognitive automa-
ticity itself, we interpret our results in relative terms. As recently
reviewed by Moors (2015), one view is that automaticity is an all-or-
nothing phenomenon and that there is a perfect agreement between
different features of automaticity (a given process is unintentional, un-
aware, effortless, and uncontrollable or intentional, aware, effortful, and
controllable). Another view is that automaticity is a gradual phenome-
non and that different features of automaticity are partly independent
from each other. In line with the gradual view, which seems more
grounded in social psychology research (Bargh, 1994; Moors, 2015),
we think that self-processing in our study was probably not completely
effortless, but it was certainlymore effortless than other-processing.
The results of Experiment II imply that familiarity per se was not the
main driving force in our study. Our RT data showed that (i) self-related
interference was still weaker than famous-related interference and
(ii) the difference between the “famous” and “unknown” conditions
was not signiﬁcant. These two pieces of evidence taken together suggest
that lower interference in the “self” than in the “other” condition could
not be reduced to a simple familiar vs. unfamiliar difference, this notion
is consistentwith previous studies (Ma&Han, 2010;Qin et al., 2012; Sui
et al., 2012). On the other hand, FiER seemed weaker than UiER (Fig. 2B)
and, strictly speaking, the non-signiﬁcant FiRT vs. UiRT difference is statis-
tically inconclusive. Besides, additional measures in Experiment II indi-
cated that familiarity associated with famous others was relatively low
when compared to close others, which suggests that perhaps we did
not cover the whole spectrum of familiarity in the “famous” condition
(see Supplementary Information). Future studies are needed to further
dissociate the effects of self-relevance and familiarity.As amethodological clariﬁcation, we shouldmention that the differ-
ence between the “easy” and “hard” sessions in our studieswas amatter
of one vs. two rules governing a single behavioral response. In contrast,
classical dual-task interference paradigms typically involvemultiple be-
havioral responses or task switching (Pashler, 1994). In addition, we
measured how the letter case task interfered with person-identiﬁcation
and not the other way around. Thus, we can only speculate that the
same pattern of results would occur in a task in which participants are
asked to indicate the letter case, but only when a target refers to them-
selves. More research is needed to reveal the full picture of self-related
interference across different experimental manipulations.
In sum, the present study suggests that the goal-directed processing
of self-relevant information is related to less cognitive interference than
the processing of information about other people. Explaining the inter-
play between self-oriented and world-oriented mental processes is a
key to reveal the cognitive architecture of the human self. Apart from
fundamental theoretical questions, this interplay is important to explain
a number of practical situations, for example, attention lapses in healthy
individuals or in people with attention deﬁcits.
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